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Imageability is a complex and controver-
sial measure as was already noted by Paivio
et al. (1968) when they first introduced the
term. According to these authors image-
ability should describe the ease/difficulty
with which “words arouse a sensory expe-
rience” (p. 4) and therefore should closely
correlate with concreteness. Since concrete
objects are experienced through the senses,
the words that denote them should eas-
ily re-evoke that sensory experience: words
high in concreteness should also be high
in imageability and vice versa. However,
Paivio et al. also noted an interesting asym-
metry: some terms with low concrete-
ness ratings (i.e., abstract terms) had high
imageability ratings. The peculiarity of
these words is that they have strong emo-
tional connotations (Paivio et al., 1968, p.
7). (They also noted a few terms with high
concreteness and low imageability ratings
such as e.g., astrolab, but these are easy
to explain: people know that they denote
concrete objects, but they do not know
what they look like).
Westbury et al. (2013) aim is mainly
pragmatic, and consists in “estimating
imageability using algorithmic methods
grounded in empirical measures,” and we
are quite sympathetic to this endeavor.
Nevertheless, the measures these authors
rely on clearly imply a theoretical account
able to deal with the anomalies of this con-
struct. Their strategy is to distinguish two
aspects of imageability: (a) the relation-
ship between imageability and context,
and (b) the relationship between image-
ability and emotionality. The line of rea-
soning they adopt to develop their method
is the following.
(a) The first measure introduced is “den-
sity of the context,” a measure derived
from Context Availability Theory
which maintains that the difference
between concrete and abstract words
can be reduced to the fact that it is
easier (faster) to describe the proper-
ties of concrete than of abstract words
when they are presented without con-
text. “Density of the context” is a mea-
sure which reflects how low image-
ability words—like low concreteness
words—depend more on contextual
information than high imageability
(and high concreteness) words. In
this sense words with high imageabil-
ity ratings are considered to behave
analogously to words with high con-
creteness playing a more important
role when context is less dense.
However, as e.g., Prinz (2002) notes, the
context effects derived from Context
Availability Theory are also compat-
ible with the predictions made by
its most important competitor, i.e.,
Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory (1986,
2007), which proposes an explanation
of the abstract/concrete difference that is
radically different from a psychological
perspective: “In the dual-code model,
abstract word comprehension relies on
verbal information. As a result, pro-
cessing speed for abstract words should
increase when more verbal information
is provided. The dual-code model also
predicts that there will be no comparable
improvement in performance on concrete
words because performance is already
near ceiling levels when concrete words
are presented in isolation” (Prinz, 2002,
p. 132). If the two accounts make the same
prediction, then the results of Westbury
and colleagues do not necessarily favor the
Context Availability Theory over the Dual
Coding Theory.
Thus, the reason why the density of the
context is a good predictor of imageability
does not necessarily relate to the fact that
the difference between concrete/imageable
vs. abstract words can be reduced to dif-
ferences in the way these words depend on
context and the possibility that imageabil-
ity may rely on semantic properties cannot
be ruled out. In fact, the density of the
context would also be a good measure of
imageability if the difference between con-
crete/imageable vs. abstract depended on
how the semantic system is structured, as
Paivio suggests, since the way words are
represented influences whether they rely
strongly or weakly on context.
(b) Second, imageability is related to
abstractness and is described on
the basis of the theoretical account
largely developed by Altarriba et al.
(1999) and Kousta et al. (2011) who
maintain that “affective information
(emotional association [. . .]) is
more important for abstract than
concrete concepts.” From these studies
Westbury and collaborators derive
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the second predictor of imageability,
which they call “emotional valence,”
and which they claim can account for
the asymmetry already identified by
Paivio and collaborators: For some
words characterized by strong emo-
tional connotations imageability is
significantly higher than concreteness.
Taken together, these two measures
describe imageability in the way Paivio
et al. did when the construct was origi-
nally introduced. In fact, they reproduce
the intrinsic ambiguity of the words with
high or relatively high imageability ratings
which, if they also have high concreteness
ratings behave like concrete words, but
if they have low concreteness ratings are
of high emotional valence. Notably, these
observations challenge Westbury and col-
laborators’ assumption that “imageability
judgments are correlated with factors that
have nothing to do with evoked sensation
[. . .].” On the contrary, one could argue
that the factors they identify support the
hypothesis that imageability measures
evoke sensations; however, they support
this claim in a slightly different version
also suggested by Paivio in his later works.
Words with high imageability and high
concreteness ratings evoke sensations con-
nected to the perception of the objects
they denote, while words with high image-
ability and low concreteness ratings evoke
sensations connected to affective arousal
(Paivio, 1986, 2007).
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